Federal Regulation of Union Political Expenditures: New Wine in Old Bottles by Hatch, Stanley N.
BYU Law Review
Volume 1977 | Issue 1 Article 10
3-1-1977
Federal Regulation of Union Political Expenditures:
New Wine in Old Bottles
Stanley N. Hatch
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stanley N. Hatch, Federal Regulation of Union Political Expenditures: New Wine in Old Bottles, 1977 BYU L. Rev. 99 (1977).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1977/iss1/10
COMMENTS 
Federal Regulation of Union Political 
Expenditures: New Wine in Old Bottles 
Neither do men put new wine into old bottles: else the bottles 
break and the wine runneth out, and the bottles perish: but they 
put new wine into new bottles, and both are preserved. 
Matthew 9:17 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Speaking for the American Federation of Labor in 1952, Wil-
liam Green fervently articulated the attitude that has inspired 
union~sts to intense political involvement in the twentieth cen-
tury: 
Elect our friends! Defeat our enemies! That slogan contains no 
element of hesitation-no hint of neutrality. It sounds a call to 
action. Vigorous and aggressive political action is the only way 
to carry out its dictates. 1 
Encouraged by this enthusiastic political philosophy, American 
labor unions have amassed a political potential that incumbents 
and challengers nervously but eagerly court. 2 Unions have devel-
oped in a relatively short period of time a well..;oiled and com-
puterized machine that has accurately been termed "one of the 
most powerful political forces in the country, "3 and which has 
consistently been able to apply millions of dollars and hundreds 
of thousands of man-hours to the task of defeating enemies and 
electing friends. 4 Due in large measure to the momentum and 
1. Green, We Are Not Neutral, AM. FEDERATIONIST, July 1952, at 3. In May of 1962, 
George Meany reemphasized the importance of labor's role in politics as he remarked to 
a conference of the Committee on Political Education (COPE) that "labor's most impor-
tant activity" at that time was political involvement. AFL-CIO News, May 5, 1962, at 1, 
col. 2. 
2. It has been estimated that as of 1954, American labor boasted a political potential 
consisting of 16 million workers plus their spouses and families. Hudson & Rosen, Union 
Political Action: The Member Speaks, 7 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 404 (1954). More re-
cently, the New Republic Magazine has suggested that "[e]ach campaign is eager to 
demonstrate its labor support, and most need the assistance that union backing normally 
brings .... "Bode, Six Million Workers Minus George Meany, NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 31, 
1976, at 7. 
3. Labor's Best-Heeled Powerhouse, TIME, Mar. 1, 1976, at 10. 
4. The success of labor's political involvement is generally credited to the efforts of 
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speed that have accompanied organized labor's dizzy rise to polit-
ical power, a heated and longstanding debate between those who 
feel that "labor has no proper concern with a political question 
not directly and immediately related to wages, hours, and work-
ing conditions" and those who hold that "there is no political 
question which will not, in the end, have such an effect" has 
pervaded the political arena.5 
Motivated partly by the scope of labor's political influence 
and partly by the intensity of the arguments regarding the pro-
priety of that influence, Congress initiated legislation early in the 
1940's to limit the use of labor money for political purposes.6 
Section 441 b of the United States Code, Title 2, enacted in 1976, 
represents the most recent expression of that legislative effort. 7 
From its beginning, the federal response to union political in-
volvement engendered almost as much controversy as the prob-
lem it was intended to alleviate. Through judicial interpretation, 
union loophole exploitation, and legislative repair, the law gov-
erning labor political spending evolved into a regulatory scheme 
of questionable validity and uncertain scope. 
A detailed examination of the development of restrictions 
upon union political involvement provides a clearer understand-
ing of the conflicts and tensions which pervade that realm of 
political activity as well as the available alternatives for solving 
the problems associated with labor campaign spending. 
the AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education (COPE). The effectiveness of political 
involvement committees was initially demonstrated in 1936 by Labor's Nonpartisan 
League, which coordinated union campaigning and contributions to elect Franklin Roose-
velt. The increased political needs of the 1940's inspired the CIO's Political Action 
Committee (PAC) and the AFL's Labor League for Political Education (LLPE). With the 
merger of the AFL and the CIO in 1955, the political machinery of PAC and LLPE was 
consolidated in the form of COPE. (For a detailed description of COPE's organization and 
function, see C. REHMus & D. McLAuGHLIN, LABoR AND AMERICAN POLITICS 207 (1967)). 
Since 1955, COPE has flourished into labor's powerful and persuasive political and public 
relations tool. One writer predicted that COPE, under the leadership of Alexander Bar-
kan, would "wield a tremendous influence in [the 1976] election," by "pour[ing] not 
only money but armies of workers into the campaign, mount[ing] mass mailing, and 
mobiliz[ing] one of the most powerful political forces in the country." Labor's Best-
Heeled Powerhouse, TIME, Mar. 1, 1976, at 10. 
5. See Zoli, Labor in Politics, 27 LAw & CoNTEMP. PaoB. 234, 234-35 (1962). 
6. See Chang, Labor Political Action and the Taft-Hartley Act, 33 NEB. L. REv. 554, 
560-61 & n.35 (1954). 
7. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b (1976). 
99] REGULATION OF UNION CONTRIBUTIONS 101 
II. REGULATION OF UNION POLITICAL ACTIVITY: AN HISTORICAL 
OvERVIEW 
A. Legislative Evolution 
Section 441b exhibits a long and active history. Its first legis-
lative progenitor appeared on January 26, 1907, as a curb upon 
corporate political influence. Congress had become keenly aware 
of both the unusually powerful financial influence that corpora-
tions exercised upon national and state elections and the appar-
ently unlimited discretion with which they dispensed sharehold-
ers' money for political purposes.8 
In an attempt to more completely purify the electoral process 
and defend "the public interest in free elections,"9 federal law-
makers enacted a strict prohibition forbidding corporations from 
making money contributions in connection with federal elec-
tions. 10 The judiciary apparently took no notice of the statute for 
almost a decade. In 1916, however, a federal district court in 
Pennsylvania explicitly recognized the enactment as being con-
stitutional.11 A short time later, the United States Supreme 
Court, although not directly concerned with the 1907 Act, 
inadvertently infused a serious element of doubt into parts of the 
existing law. In Newberry v. United States, 12 the Court, among 
other things, clearly invalidated federal regulation of Senate pri-
mary elections. As a consequence, Congress was forced to con-
sider ~ comprehensive revision of its earlier limitation on corpo-
rate political spending. The result, the Federal Corrupt Practices 
Act of 1925,13 not only eliminated the Newberry problem by defin-
ing primary elections as outside the scope of the Act, but also 
strengthened the prohibitions in the 1907 statute. 14 
While corporate political fervor was being dampened by Con-
gress, American labor was just beginning to flex its political mus-
cles. By the late 1930's, unions began to blossom into major power 
8. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948). 
9. United States v. Pipefitters Local 562, 434 F.2d 1116, 1119 (8th Cir. 1970). 
10. Act of Jan. 26, 1907, 34 Stat. 864-65 (1907). 
11. United States v. United States Brewers' Ass'n, 239 F. 163 (W.D. Pa. 1916). 
12. 256 u.s. 232 (1921). 
13. Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, tit. ill, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925). 
14. The Supreme Court explained the effect of the statute in the following words: 
"[The Act of 1925] strengthened the 1907 statute (1) by ch~nging the phrase "money 
contribution" to "contribution" ... ; (2) by extending the prohibition on corporate contri-
butions ... ; and (3) by penalizing the recipient of any forbidden contribution as well as 
the contributor." United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 577 (1957). 
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blocs. 15 During the 1936 election, labor political influence was felt 
in favor of Democratic candidates to the tune of $770,000. 16 This 
development quickly aroused the attention of Congress, which 
sought to extend the limitations imposed by the Act of 1925 to 
labor unions by restraining "all organizations ... whose aims or 
purposes are the furtherance of group, class, or special 
interests. " 17 In 1940, the Hatch Act accomplished this result in 
part by explicitly restricting political contributions by organiza-
tions, including labor unions, to a maximum of $5,000.18 It was 
soon obvious, however, that this limitation provided no serious 
obstacle to labor's support of chosen candidates. In the 1940 elec-
tion, instead of making large national contributions, union lead-
ership sidestepped the legislation by making extensive smaller 
donations, each within the $5,000 limit, through its numerous 
local organizations. 19 
With the advent of World War II, the power of organized 
labor became apparent to a degree unprecedented in American 
history. As the nation mobilized its industrial energy to the full 
extent of its resources, the threat of paralyzing strikes empha-
sized the position of leverage that labor had gained to those both 
within and without its ranks. When the United Mine Workers 
closed down the coal industry in the early part of 1943, the danger 
to the nation's war effort motivated Congress to enact the War 
Labor Disputes Act (WLDA). 20 This legislation not only answered 
the immediate emergency by preventing crippling wartime 
strikes, but it went one step further and applied the broad prohi-
bitions outlined in the Act of 1925 against corporate political 
spending to labor organizations for the duration of the war. 21 Jus-
15. Comment, Political Contributions by Labor Unions, 40 TEx. L. REv. 665, 666 
(1962) [hereinafter cited as Political Contributions by Labor Unions]. 
16. Kallenbach, The Taft-Hartley_ Act and Union Political Contributions and 
Expenditures, 33 MINN. L. REv. 1, 2 & n.3 (1948). 
17. S. REP. No. 151, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 127, 135 (1937). 
18. Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, § 13, 54 Stat. 767, 770 (1940). 
19. Kallenbach, supra note 16, at 4. 
20. War Labor Disputes Act of 1943, 57 Stat. 163 (1943). 
21. The Supreme Court noted the following reasons for extending the provisions of 
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 to labor organizations: 
[The] legislative history [of the WLDA] indicates congressional belief that 
labor unions should then be put under the same restraints as had been imposed 
upon corporations. It was felt that the influence which labor unions exercised 
over elections through monetary expenditures should be minimized, and that it 
was unfair to individual union members to permit the union leadership to make 
contributions from general union funds to a political party which the individual 
member might oppose. 
United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 115 (1948)(footnotes omitted). See also note 81 infra. 
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tice Rutledge, later reviewing the extension of these restrictions 
to union political spending, outlined the three objectives that 
Congress sought to further by its action: 
[T]he sponsors and proponents had in mind three principal 
objectives. 
These were: (1) To reduce what had come to be regarded 
in the light of recent experience as the undue and dispropor-
tionate influence of labor unions upon federal elections; (2) to 
preserve the purity of such elections and of official conduct 
ensuing from the choices made in them against the use of aggre-
gated wealth by union ... entities; and (3) to protect union 
members holding political views contrary to those supported by 
the union from use of funds contributed by them to promote 
acceptance of those opposing views. Shortly, these objects may 
be designated as the "undue influence," "purity of elections," 
and "minority protection" objectives.22 
American labor was not alone in its disapproval of this new 
restriction. President Roosevelt immediately vetoed the legisla-
tion, citing as among its most objectionable features the provision 
that barred labor political contributions. 23 Congress would not be 
denied, however, and the veto was overridden. As long as the war 
continued, union political activity appeared significantly inhib-
ited. 
Soon after the war, Congress discovered that appearances 
had been drastically misleading. In spite of the confines imposed 
on labor by the WLDA, rumors circulated concerning enormous 
union political spending during the 1944 campaigns. Apprehen-
sion and suspicion became so intense that Congress organized a 
special committee to investigate the allegations. The search con-
centrated on special political organizations such as the CIO's 
Political Action Committee (PAC). The investigation quickly dis-
covered that unions had, in fact, spent more money in 1944 than 
in any previous election, 24 but it reluctantly concluded that 
inasmuch as unions had limited their campaign support to 
"expenditures" of money for political advertising as opposed to 
"contributions," there was no clear-cut violation of the 1943 pro-
22. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 134-35 (1948)(Rutledge, J., concurring) (foot-
note omitted). 
23. Kallenbach, supra note 16, at 5. 
24. Comment, Regulation of Labor's Political Contributions and Expenditures: The 
British and American Experience, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 371, 374 (1952) [hereinafter cited 
as British and American Experience]. 
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hibitions. 25 Many lawmakers who had assisted in passing the 
WLDA understandably expressed grave concern over the amount 
of money that labor had expended in the previous election and 
the ease with which it had bypassed the statutory limitations. 
The House Special Committee to Investigate Campaign Expendi-
tures, in its 1945 Report, soberly observed: 
The scale of operation of some of these organizations is 
impressive. Without exception, they operate on a Nation-wide 
basis; and many of them have affiliated local organizations. One 
was found to have an annual budget for "educational" work 
approximating $1,500,000, and among other things regularly 
supplies over 500 radio stations with "briefs for broadcasters." 
Another, with an annual budget of over $300,000 for political 
"education," has distributed some 80,000,000 pieces of litera-
ture, including a quarter million copies of one article. Another, 
representing an organized labor membership of 5,000,000, has 
raised $700,000 for its national organizations in union contribu-
tions for political "education" in a few months, and a great deal 
more has been raised for the same purpose and expended by its 
local organizations. 28 
With the discovery of the extent of labor's financial investment 
in the political arena, a serious sentiment began to develop in 
various quarters encouraging sricter regulation of labor campaign 
expenditures. 
Labor involvement in the 1944 presidential election and the 
1946 senatorial campaigns was fresh in everyone's memory as 
Congress began to consider a comprehensive package of labor 
legislation in 1947. The Taft-Hartley Act27 emerged from the de-
bates of that year with a clear indication that Congress was deter-
mined to plug the loopholes in the previous law curtailing union 
political spending. Section 304 of that Act28 effectuated this con-
gressional disapproval of the extravagant use of union money 
25. S. REP. No. 101, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1945). 
26. H.R. REP. No. 2093, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3 (1945). 
27. 61 Stat. 136 (1947). 
28. The section was codified in 18 U.S.C. § 610, where it remained until1976, when 
it was repealed and replaced by 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b. As originally enacted in section 304 of 
the Taft-Hartley Act, the statute stated: 
It is unlawful for any . . . labor organization to make a contribution or 
expenditure in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice 
Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in . . . Congress are to be 
voted for, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or 
caucus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices . . . . 
61 Stat. 136, 159 (1947). 
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during political campaigns by (1) forbidding "expenditures" in 
addition to "contributions;" (2) making permanent the applica-
tion to labor organizations of the 1925 restrictions upon political 
activity; and (3) extending its coverage to federal primaries and 
nominating conventions. 29 As President Roosevelt had previously 
done with the WLDA, President Truman quickly vetoed the Taft-
Hartley Act, noting as particularly offensive the ban against 
union political expenditures. Again, however, the legislation be-
came law without the President's approval as Congress commit-
ted itself to control labor money in politics on a more rigorous and 
comprehensive scale.30 
B. Judicial Whittling 
American labor unions quickly demonstrated their dissatis-
faction with section 304. After carefully considering the most 
effective way to voice their displeasure, and upon the advice of 
counsel, labor decided to initiate calculated violations of the stat-
ute, thereby inviting the courts to scrutinize its prohibitions.31 
The first meaningful opportunity to challenge the statute arose 
in United States v. C/032 as a result of union activities during a 
special Maryland election for a representative to Congress. With 
the express purpose of violating the law,33 Phillip Murray, Presi-
dent of the CIO published an editorial in the CIO news (a union 
periodical) supporting one of the candidates. The project was 
financed out of general union funds, and the periodical was dis-
tributed not only to union members but also to the general public 
to the extent of about 1,000 copies. The trial court squarely con-
29. United States v.·UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 582-83 (1957). 
30. Kallenbach, supra note 16, at 9 & n.31. 
31. Comment, Union Political Expenditures Under Taft-Hartley Section 304, 48 Nw. 
U.L. REv. R 64, 68 (1953). The article makes mention of a New York Times' report which 
indicated that approximately 75 lawyers from around the country gathered under the 
direction of the AFL to decide how to respond to the new restrictions. It was there decided 
that all unions should affirmatively violate the statute. Id. at 68 n.22. 
32. 77 F. Supp. 355 (D.D.C.), aff'd on other grounds, 335 U.S. 106 (1948). 
33. See Raub, Legality of Union Political Expenditures, 34 S. CALIF. L. REv. 152, 156-
57 (1961); Comment, An Attempt to Restrict Union and Corporate Political Activity, 46 
MARQ. L. REv. 364, 367 (1962-3) [hereinafter cited as An Attempt to Restrict]. 
Counsel for CIO not only failed to argue, both at trial and upon appeal, that the 
actions of the union were not a violation of the Act but actually admitted that the statute 
covered the circumstances and that the only question for adjudication was the constitu-
tionality of the law. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 128~29 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring); Rauh, supra at 156. The facts surrounding publication of the editorial seem 
to indicate that efforts were made to insure that the action would be viewed as an expendi-
ture. 
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fronted the issue presented by the case and declared the restric-
tions on union spending unconstitutional as an abridgement of 
first amendment freedoms. 34 On appeal, even though no argu-
ment had been made as to the applicability of the statute and in 
spite of the fact that the constitutional question had been clearly 
accentuated for consideration,35 the Supreme Court purposely 
skirted the issues as framed and held that section 304 did not 
apply to the facts of the case. The Court defended its holding by 
reasoning that a union periodical, published with union funds, 
that advocated the election of a candidate for federal office could 
not be considered an unlawful "expenditure" if it was distributed 
"in regular course to those accustomed to receive copies."36 To 
hold otherwise, the Court added, would raise serious doubts as to 
the statute's constitutionality. This decision was surprising not 
only because the constitutional question had been so carefully 
prepared for review, but, more importantly, because it flew in the 
face of congressional intent and the plain meaning of the stat-
ute.37 By judicial definition, a union periodical, published in 
"regular course," could now be distributed, to some extent at 
least, to the general public in addition to the union membership 
and still fall outside the scope of the prohibition. The decision not 
only narrowed the statute's practical applicability but also re-
vealed that certain Justices entertained "gravest doubts" as to its 
constitutionality. 38 
A year after the CIO decision, the courts were afforded a 
second opportunity to consider the propriety of union political 
spending. In United States v. Painters Local481, 39 a Connecticut 
34. 77 F. Supp. 355, 359 (D.D.C.), aff'd on other grounds, 335 U.S. 106 (1948). 
35. So anxious were the parties for a constitutional adjudication that Justice Frank-
furter suggested that the manner in which the question was presented appeared almost 
collusive: "[T]he manner by which the constitutional issue had been brought to the 
Supreme Court for decision bordered on collusion. Government counsel, he maintained, 
had failed in the lower court proceedings to advance 'the most effective and the least 
misapprehending grounds for supporting what Congress had enacted . . . . '"Kallenbach, 
supra note 16, at 15. See 335 U.S. at 126-27 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
36. 335 U.S. at 123. 
37. !d. at 138-40 (Rutledge, J ., concurring); Kallenbach, supra note 16, at 17 -18; 
Comment, Unions in the Political Arena: Legislative Attempts to Control Union Partici-
patior:t in Politics, 23 Sw. L.J. 713,716-17 (1969); British and American Experience, supra 
note 24, at 376-77 & n.44; Note, Interpretation of Statutes to Avoid Constitutional Ques-
tions Re Labor Union Political Contributions, 22 Mo. L. REv. 348, 354 (1962); see Note, 
Section 304 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 After the Decision In The 
United States us. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 1949 Wis. L. REv. 184, 191 (1949). 
38. 335 U.S. at 121. See also Note, Statutory Interpretation Under Labor-
Management Relations Act-Prohibition of Union Political Expenditures, 47 MicH. L. 
REv. 408, 410 (1949). 
39. 172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949). 
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union authorized the purchase of advertising space in a newspa-
per of general circulation and radio broadcast time in order to 
advocate the defeat of Senator Taft, a cosponsor of the legislation 
under which the union was prosecuted. The expenditures for both 
items totaled just under $145. As in CIO, there was no argument 
at trial that the statute was inapplicable, 40 only that it was uncon-
stitutional. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, however, following the Supreme Court's cue, avoided the 
constitutional question altogether and held that the present case 
was beyond the reach of the statute. The court noted: 
In the decision in [ CJO] . . . a majority of the Supreme Court 
held that a publication in a union newspaper which was distrib-
uted to members and a few other persons, did not fall within the 
prohibition of the statute. While . . . the publication was by the 
union itself and reached a somewhat limited class of readers, 
[the Court] nowhere said that a publication in an ordinary 
newspaper paid for out of the funds of a union would not also 
be outside of the coverage of the Act .... It seems impossible, 
on principle, to differentiate the scope of that decision from the 
case we have before us. It is hard to imagine that a greater 
number of people would be affected by the advertisement and 
broadcasting in the present case than by publication in the 
union periodical . . . . In a practical sense the situations are 
very similar, for in the case at bar this small union owned no 
newspaper and a publication in the daily press or by radio was 
as natural a way of communicating its views to its members as 
by a newspaper of its own. 41 
In an effort to further justify its decision, the court pointed to the 
"trifling 'expenditures"' that inspired the prosecution and im-
plied that their de minimis nature might also prevent application 
of the statute.42 If the Supreme Court in CIO could be said to have 
ignored the legislative history in construing the prohibition, the 
Second Circuit affirmatively offended it. 43 
Painters Local 481 carved out a substantial exception to the 
limitations upon union political expenditures by exempting from 
the operation of the statute not only union-owned periodicals, 
but, at least in the case of small local unions, general newspaper 
40. An Attempt to Restrict, supra note 33, at 367. 
41. 172 F.2d at 856. 
42. See Ruark, Labor's Political Spending and Free Speech, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 61,75-
76 (1958). 
43. As one writer pointed out, "Senator Pepper stated on the floor that the act 
applied to expenditures of 'a dollar, or 50 cents, or $500, or $1000."' ld. at 75. 
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advertisements and radio broadcasts as well. In addition, it cast 
further doubt upon the constitutionality of the statute which 
could only be resolved if, and when, section 304 was held applica-
ble in a particular case. 
The next opportunity for the courts to examine union politi-
cal spending followed closely behind Painters Local 481. In 
United States v. Construction & General Laborers Local 264, 44 a 
Mississippi federal district court was confronted with a fact situa-
tion that appeared to be significantly different from the earlier 
cases. The alleged expenditures in Laborers· Local 264 had been 
authorized by the president of a local union to further his per-
sonal campaign for Congress. The facts indicated that the money 
had been spent in the form of salaries for a union business agent 
and three other union employees. While the business agent de-
voted most of his time to conducting the campaign, the three 
employees worked part time electioneering for the defendant and 
part time in so-called "nonpartisan" activities such as get-out-
the-vote drives and voter registration programs. 45 Ignoring the 
substantial factual variations, the court faithfully mimicked the 
earlier cases and avoided the constitutional question. The author 
of the majority opinion, relying first upon CIO and then upon 
Painters Local 481, expressed disbelief that Congress could have 
intended such a restriction upon labor spending and, while ad-
mitting that de minimus non curat lex did not apply in the crimi-
nal context, concluded that the money involved was such an 
"uncertain, insignificant amount" that it could not be governed 
by the statute. 
The decision was clearly erroneous from two standpoints. 
First, it violated legislative history in an offhanded fashion not 
44. 101 F. Supp. 869 (W.D. Mo. 1951). 
45. The court accorded an unusual degree of significance to the "nonpartisan" activi-
ties of the three employees at the expense of other activities that were undeniably 
"partisan" in their effect and intent. One writer noted this fact with the following observa-
tion: 
Ignoring the extreme distrust of labor unions that motivated the strongest sup-
porters of the restrictive legislation, the court reasoned that Congress could not 
have intended to deprive labor organizations of their constitutionally protected 
right to engage in political activities. The partisan nature of the activity in 
question was camouflaged with glowing language about the altruism of voter 
registration. [In fact, voter registration was the most neutral of a variety of 
activities, including distribution of campaign literature and operation of a cam-
paign trailer.] 
Comment, Of Politics, Pipefitters, and Section 610: Union Political Contributions in 
Modern Context, 51 TEx. L. REv. 936, 947 & n.52 (1973) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter 
cited as Of Politics]. 
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of union dues to pay for commercial broadcasts that are designed 
to urge the public to elect a certain candidate."50 Thus, by focus-
ing its attention on the source of the funds as well as the fact that 
the communication was intended for the public at large, 51 the 
Court gave the statute its first application, but still avoided con-
stitutional issues. 
Although the Court in UA W left in doubt the effect of its 
decision upon Painters Local 481 and Laborers Local 264, it was 
assumed that at least the former had been overruled sub silen-
tio.52 Most of what the decision in UA W gained for the statute was 
challenged, however, in United States v. Anchorage Central 
Labor Council. 53 There, in a fact situation almost identical to the 
earlier case, an association of labor unions had sponsored political 
television announcements intended to reach not only union mem-
hers, but also the general public. Tightroping its way through the 
UA W rationale, the federal district court distinguished the case 
at bar by concluding that the expenditures in question were de-
rived from "voluntary" contributions. In support of this argu-
ment, the court noted that the individual local unions had de-
cided by majority vote to contribute funds to the Council for 
political purposes. What it failed to recognize was the fact that 
the funds came exclusively from general union treasuries. As 
scholars quickly perceived, the court's distinction and reasoning 
were precarious at best.54 The court openly admitted that such a 
result could "render virtually impossible the enforcement of the 
statute. "55 
After UA W and Anchorage, the question of union political 
expenditures did not arise in the courts for almost twelve years. 
In 1972, however, the controversy came before the Supreme Court 
for the third time since the Taft-Hartley Act was passed. In 
Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 56 the Court examined a 
50. 352 U.S. at 586-87. 
51. In outlining those inquiries that it felt would be productive in the determination 
of what union political expenditures were proscribed by the statute, the Court noted the 
following: 
[W]as the broadcast paid for out of the general dues of the union membership 
or may the funds be fairly said to have been obtained on a voluntary basis? Did 
the broadcast reach the public at large or only those affiliated with appellee? 
!d. at 592. 
52. Of Politics, supra note 45, at 948. 
53. 193 F. Supp. 504 (D. Alas. 19t31). 
54. An Attempt to Restrict, supra note 33, at 369. 
55. 193 F. Supp. at 508. 
56. 407 u.s. 385 (1972). 
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"Voluntary, Political, Educational, Legislative, Charity and De-
fense Fund" which had contributed over $150,000 to candidates 
for federal office between 1964 and 1966. Both the government 
and the union agreed substantially as to the facts. The fund was 
controlled and administered by the principal union officer. Al-
though formally separate, the fund and the union were closely 
related at all levels. As a consequence, "voluntary" contributions 
were employed for political and nonpolitical purposes alike. As to 
collection of funds, the union itself conceded that 
contributions to the Fund were routinely made at regular inter-
vals at job sites; that they were routinely collected by union 
stewards, area foremen, general foremen, or other agents of the 
union; that they were determined by a formula based upon the 
amount of hours or overtime hours worked upon a job under the 
jurisdiction of the union . . . . 57 
The Court went even further by noting that the members who 
made contributions to the fund did so "voluntarily" only "in the 
same sense tht they paid their dues or other financial obliga-
tions."58 
Like his predecessors, Justice Brennan, writing for the ma-
jority, carefully sidestepped the constitutional questions pre-
sented59 and concentrated on defining the scope of section 304. 
Shifting emphasis significantly from the two former Supreme 
Court decisions, Justice Brennan focused almost exclusively on 
two points of interpretation: the separateness of the fund and the 
voluntary nature of the contributions.80 As to the first point, the 
Court held that a fund from which political contributions were 
drawn must be "separate from the sponsoring union only in the 
sense that there must be a strict segregation of its monies from 
union dues and assessments. " 81 In addition, administration and 
organization of the fund could be financed from the general union 
treasury if it was segregated as defined.82 With respect to the 
second point, the Court stated that although all money donations 
had to be "voluntary," and any solicitation had to be performed 
in such a manner as to clearly indicate "that donations are for a 
57. ld. at 392-93 n.3. 
58. Jd. at 393. 
59. Holding that the lower court's judgment required reversal because of erroneous 
jury instructions, Justice Brennan pointed out that such a "disposition makes decision of 
the constitutional issues premature, and we therefore do not decide them." ld. at 400. 
60. See Of Politics, supra note 45, at 961-62, 970. 
61. 407 U.S. at 414 (emphasis added). 
62. ld. at 429-30. 
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political purpose and that those solicited may decline to contrib-
ute without loss of job ... or any other reprisal within the 
union's institutional power," solicitation of funds by union offi-
cials was permissible. 63 As Justice Powell quickly pointed out, the 
decision not only made possible the collection of contributions 
that exhibited the "trappings of voluntariness" while retaining 
the "substance of coercion,"64 but it also enabled unions to estab-
lish and maintain substantial treasure chests for political activity 
with no more concern for distinctness than a "separate ledger and 
bank account."65 The Court's holding neither resolved the confu-
sion as to just where the permissible bounds of union political 
expenditures lay, nor did it accomplish even partial resolution of 
the constitutional doubts that had grown up around the prohibi-
tions. 
C. Legislative Response 
The Pipefitters decision undoubtedly resulted in large mea-
sure from a 1972 amendment to section 304 of the Taft-Hartley 
Act that was passed as part of the Federal Election Campaign Act 
(FECA) 66 while the case was pending before the United States 
Supreme Court. As the Court pointed out after reviewing supple-
mental briefs filed by both parties outlining the effect of the 
amendment upon existing law, section 205 of the FECA was little 
more than an attempt by Congress to codify prior legislative and 
judicial modifications of section 304,67 It appears, however, that 
the Court carried the new amendment further than its initial 
63. /d. at 414. 
64. /d. at 449 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
65. /d. at 450 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
66. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 10 (amending 18 U .S.C. § 610 
(1970)). The amendment added to the section the following pertinent language: 
As used in this section, the phrase "contribution or expenditure" shall 
include any direct or indirect payment . . . or anything of value . . . to any 
candidate, campaign committee, or political party or organization, in connec-
tion with any election [governed by this section]; but shall not include commu-
nications ... by a labor organization to its members and their families on any 
subject; nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns ... by a 
labor organization aimed at its members and their families; the establishment, 
administration, and solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund 
to be utilized for political purposes by ... a labor organization: Provided, That 
it shall be unlawful for such a fund to make a contribution or expenditure by 
utilizing money or anything of value secured by physical force, job discrimina-
tion, or financial reprisals; or by dues, fees, or other monies required as a ... 
condition of employment, or by monies obtained in any commercial transaction. 
67. 407 U.S. at 399. 
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characterization would indicate. Not only did it read the phrase 
"separate segregated fund" more narrowly than prior decisions 
demanded,88 but it held that general union treasuries, theoreti-
cally sacred against use for political contributions, were fully 
available for the establishment, administration, and solicitation 
of contributions to a political fund-a use arguably prohibited by 
prior law. 89 Some writers viewed the amendment as having trans-
formed section 304 to such an extent that protection against the 
corrupting influence of aggregations of wealth, one of the primary 
purposes behind the original legislation, was no longer of even 
secondary importance, "since the amendment permitted both 
unlimited political campaigning directed at members . . . when 
funded out of the organizations' general treasuries and unlimited 
political campaigning directed at the public if the source of the 
funds was voluntary. "70 
As a consequence of this interplay between judicial and legis-
lative interpretation, labor unions appeared to gain an unusual 
confidence in their ability to solicit and spend money for political 
purposes. In 1973, however, this confidence was answered with a 
flurry of federal cases that served as a general reminder that 
boundary lines existed even though they were difficult to pre-
dict.71 
While 1976 produced major amendments to the FECA, 72 
these changes have had little more effect upon existing regulation 
68. ld. at 421-22. 
69. I d. at 429-30; Of Politics, supra note 45, at 967. 
70. Comment, The Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on Corporate and Union 
Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 148, 152 (1974). 
In 1974, amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act substantially limited the 
amount of expenditures that persons, including labor organizations, could contribute in 
federal elections. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975) (contributions limited to $1000 per 
candidate per election). The law carefully exempted from its restrictions, however, any 
expenditures that were allowed under the 1972 amendment. 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(2)(B) 
(Supp. V 1975). 18 U.S.C. § 608 was repealed by the Act of May 11, 1976, Pub. L. No. 
94-283, 90 Stat. 496 (1976). 
71. United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076 
(1973) ($5,000 of general union funds were loaned to Labor Nonpartisan League to facili-
tate the funding of a testimonial dinner); Barber v. Gibbons, 367 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mo.· 
1973) (a deduction from dues of union members who signed authorization cards was placed 
in a special political fund). Cf. Reid v. UAW-AFL-CIO, 479 F.2d 517 (lOth Cir. 1973) 
(nonunion workers required to exhaust internal union grievance machinery before judi-
cially contesting the use of agency assessments). 
72. The Supeme Court held in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), that while the 
contributions provisions of the FECA as amended in 1974 were constitutional, certain 
expenditure limitations imposed an unconstitutional burden upon free speech. As a result, 
Congress extensively reevaluated its campaign legislation during 1976, proposing substan-
tial changes beyond the scope of this comment. 
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of union political spending than to relocate them in a different 
title in the Code.73 At present, the law regarding the status of 
labor's financial involvement in the political arena is neither 
more predictable nor more easily applied than it was in the begin-
ning. For thirty-three years since the restrictions were originally 
enacted in the WLDA, Congress and the courts have done little 
more than repeatedly pour new wine into old bottles in competing 
attempts to define the parameters of acceptable union political 
expenditures. 
lli. FIDELITY TO LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIVES BEHIND REGULATION OF 
UNION POLITICAL EXPENDITURES 
In C/0, Justice Rutledge outlined the three principal objec-
tives underlying Congress' regulation of union political spending 
in terms of "undue influence," "purity of elections," and 
"minority protection. " 74 It has been argued that of these objec-
tives both the "undue influence" and "purity of elections" pur-
poses have been forgotten in recent formulations of the law.75 
While it may be true that the legislation has never effectively 
accomplished its congressionally defined goals, the wisdom of 
such a limited approach to labor political involvement is highly 
suspect. The problems are no less compelling now, with or with-
out an intent on the part of Congress to deal with them, than they 
were in 1943 when prohibition of labor political spending was 
initially codified. 
A. Undue lnfiuence and Purity of Elections 
Although official reports are often misleading, and accurate 
and exhaustive figures are difficult to come by, it is obvious that 
millions of union dollars are spent on campaigns yearly. 76 One 
source has estimated approximately $62,000,000 per year as a 
likely figure. 77 By any calculation, however, it is generally con-
73. Although section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act, as codified in 18 U.S.C. § 610 and 
amended by section 205 of the FECA (1972), was repealed by the Act of May 11, 1976, 90 
Stat. 496, it reappeared substantially unchanged as part of the Federal Election Campaign 
Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b (1976). 
74. 335 U.S. at 134-35 (Rutledge, J., concurring). See note 22 and accompanying text 
supra. 
75. Comment, The Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on Corporate and Union 
Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 148, 151-52 (1974). 
76. See, e.g., Comment, Unions in the Political Arena: Legislative Attempts to Con-
trol Union Participation in Politics, 23 Sw. L.J. 713, 714 & n.13 (1969). 
77. White, Why Should Labor Leaders Play Politics with the Workers' Money?, 
READER's DIG., Oct. 1958, at 158. 
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ceded that more union money is spent on federal elections than 
is officially acknowledged. 78 Although writers have suggested that 
"no real danger to our democratic form of government has been 
demonstrated" in this kind of political involvement, 79 such a 
claim is neither supported by an examination of the history of 
union spending nor consistent with recent federal efforts to police 
political campaign financing. It appears, in fact, that unchecked 
union financial involvement exhibits an undesirable influence 
upon both the politician and the public in general. 
In 1940, as Congress was reviewing the problem of corporate 
contributions, the issue was clearly framed in the following 
words: 
We all know that money is the chief source of corruption. We 
all know that large contributions to political campaigns . . . put 
the political party under obligation to the large contributors, 
who demand pay in the way of legislation . . . . 80 
It appears that the primary reason that Congress extended the 
1925 prohibitions against corporate expenditures to include labor 
organizations was labor's indiscreet use of money as a club to 
insure that Congress voted in a manner consistent with union 
objectives, often at the expense of the public interest.81 In the 
78. Kovarsky, Unions and Federal Elections-A Social and Legal Analysis, 12 ST. 
LoUis U.L.J. 358, 369 (1968). 
79. Comment, Section 304, Taft-Hartley Act: Validity of Restrictions on Union Polit-
ical Activity, 57 YALE L.J. 806, 821 (1948). 
80. 86 CoNo. REc. 2720 (1940). 
81. The prohibition against political expenditures which found its way into the 
WLDA was neither directly responsive to the emergency that inspired the statute nor 
closely related to the other provisions of the bill. In fact, as it originally passed the Senate, 
the WLDA contained no prohibition against political expenditures. SeeS. 796, 78th Cong., 
1st Sess., 89 CoNG. REc. 3993-95 (1943). Both of these facts strongly suggest that a more 
immediate concern inspired inclusion of the provision. An explanation of Congress' sud-
den awareness of political spending is probably best understood by reference to a radio 
address made by William Green, President of the A.F. of L. In his somewhat tactless 
enthusiasm to guarantee that the bill would be defeated, Green issued the following 
warning: 
The American Federation of Labor calls upon Congress to defeat the [War 
Labor Disputes Act]. 
We will demand a record vote on this measure. Regardless of_whether it is 
killed or adopted, we shall endeavor to vote out of office any Member of Con-
gress who supports it. Into this effort the American Federation of Labor will pour 
every resource at its command. It may be recalled that some years ago the 
American Federation of Labor undertook a similar campaign against the Mem-
bers of the United States Senate who voted for confirmation to the Supreme 
Court of a Federal judge who had upheld "yellow dog" contracts. This appointee 
was not confirmed but the American Federation of Labor did not forget those 
Senators who voted for him. Within 10 years not a single one of them remained 
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words of Congressman Landis, one of the authors of the measure, 
[o]ne of the matters upon which I sensed that the public was 
taking a stand opposite to that of labor leaders was the question 
of handling of funds of labor organizations. The public was 
aroused by many rumors of huge war chests being maintained 
by labor unions, of enormous fees and dues being extorted from 
war workers, of political contributions to parties and candidates 
which later were held as clubs over the head of high Federal 
officials. 
. . .The source of much of the national trouble today in the 
coal strike situation is that ill-advised political contribution of 
another day [referring, apparently, to the reported contribution 
of over $400,000 by the United Mine Workers in the 1936 cam-
paign].82 
Similar public displeasure was expressed in 1946, when A. F. 
Whitney, President of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 
threatened that he would spend $47 million to defeat President 
Truman in his bid for reelection and $2 1/2 million to defeat any 
congressman who exhibited an inclination toward restrictive 
labor legislation. 83 The power over "public officials"· that labor 
has seemingly purchased is perhaps most sadly evident in the 
anxiousness with which prospective recipients have looked after 
labor's interests and the extent to which some politicians have 
gone to make sure that the right people know they are keeping 
the faith. 84 If calculations of labor's "success ratio" are an accu-
in the United States Senate. We trust that the Members of Congress are cogni-
zant of the fact that the political strength of the American Federation of Labor 
has increased many times since then. 
89 CoNG. REc. 5226 (1943). After a threat of such dubious propriety, Congress was moti-
vated to add the limitations on union political spending. 
82. Hearings on H.R. 804 and H.R. 1483 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. 
on Labor, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 4 (statement ofG.W. Landis, Representative in Congress 
from Indiana) (1943). 
83. N.Y. Times, May 27, 1946, at 1, col. 6. 
84. The problem was illustrated by a commentator as follows: 
While labor lobbyists never considered [John F. Kennedy] a tool of labor, as 
the author has heard one union lobbyist brutally refer to some congressmen, 
Congressman Kennedy's views ... and the legislative program of the CIO or, 
later, the AFL-CIO, were always extremely close . 
. . . . During the debate over labor regulation, which resulted in the 
Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, Senator Kennedy was on the phone with George 
Meany many days and often late into the night, discussing, arguing, compromis-
ing, and most of all reassuring the AFL-CIO head that while bitter defeat was 
ahead, presidential aspirant Kennedy had kept the faith and done everything 
humanly possible to salvage as good a bill as possible. 
Crown, Organized Labor in American Politics: A Look Ahead, N.Y.U. 14TH ANN. CONF. 
ON LAB. 261, 263-64 (1961). 
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rate indication of its political effectiveness, 85 the efforts of these 
political aspirants, while not commendable, are understandable. 
The detrimental effects of labor's extensive financial com-
mitment to the political process have been felt as deeply by the 
voting public as by the public official. During 1940, Congress 
noted this concern in the following language: 
[B]ut we also know that large sums of money are used for the 
purpose of conducting expensive campaigns through newspa-
pers and over the radio; in the publication of all sorts of litera-
ture, true and untrue; and for the purpose of paying the expen-
ses of campaigners sent out into the country to spread propa-
ganda, both true and untrue. 88 
Congress' concern appears to be well-founded when one contem-
plates the volume of what many consider to be "political propa-
ganda"87 that is forced upon an unsuspecting public. 88 This bar-
rage of political persuasion puts the individual voter at almost 
impossible odds as he competes to influence the political process. 
In addition, it has been suggested that the individual voter may 
be deprived of the opportunity to make an informed choice by the 
very nature and frequency of biased information that he re-
ceives.89 Not only may this deluge of publicity that passes for 
unanimity of purpose represent but a bare majority of the labor 
constituency, it may, in fact, reflect little more than the personal 
political desires of the few who pull the purse strings. 90 
A number of arguments have been consistently forwarded by 
union supporters in an effort to deny the "undue influence" of 
labor's political spending. Perhaps the one most often expressed 
is labor's claim that if expenditures on its part are curtailed, the 
education and political awareness of the electorate will suffer. In 
the words of one union spokesman: 
85. See, e.g., Zon, Labor in Politics, 27 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 234, 246, 248 (1962). 
86. 86 CoNG. REc. 2720 (1940). 
87. E.g., Political Contributions by Labor Unions, supra note 15, at 673-74. 
88. In 1944, the CIO's Political Action Committee entered upon a political paper 
drive unprecedented in American politics. It appears that 85 million copies of various 
campaign literature were produced by the committee in that year, which included 2 
million pamphlets, 57 million leaflets, and over 400,000 posters. Barbash, Unions, Govern-
ment, and Politics, 11Nous. & LAB. REL. REv. 66, 74 (1947). Similarly, the 1945 Report of 
the House Special Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures noted, with some 
concern, the magnitude of union spending for "educational" purposes. See note 26 and 
accompanying text supra. Unquestionably, the extent of media and communications ex-
ploitation has increased significantly in the last 31 years. 
89. See Comment, Freedom from Political Association: The Street and Lathrop 
Decisions, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 777, 789 (1962). 
90. See Political Contributions by Labor Unions, supra note 15, at 675. 
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The prime instrument for making issues the basis of votes is 
education. The continuing work of the labor movement in edu-
cating members, family and the public to study issues, make up 
their minds on issues, and cast a vote for issues is building a 
broad base of principle for American politics. No other organ-
ized force in American life carries on this political missionary 
work . . . instilling the ideal of casting a ballot for a set of 
ideas.91 
It is doubtful whether, in practice, organized labor's motives are 
quite so altruistic or its accomplishments quite so pure. In truth, 
labor's goal is practical-winning support for union advance-
ment-and its approach "propagandistic. "92 Union claims appear 
to give too little credit to the American public and too much 
credit to itself. 
A second argument, which, according to unionists, militates 
against any concern regarding the undue influence of union 
money upon the electoral process, was fervently asserted by the 
director for the Department of Politics, Education, and Training 
of the ILGUW as follows: 
To provide some financial counterweight to the generally con-
servative position of the money lords is vital to a democrary. 
And it is the labor movement that, in recent years, has moved 
toward supplying some, even if not enough, financial counter-
balance to the voice of our monied aristocracy in elections. 93 
Put in somewhat less sensational terms, unions supposedly sup-
ply the financial counterweight to corporate political spending 
that is seen as· conservative and therefore opposed to the general 
thrust of the labor movement. 
This characterization of labor's purpose in the political arena 
appears inaccurate in light of closer observations. In the first 
place, while it is true that unions and corporations operate in the 
same general sphere, courts and scholars alike have long recog-
nized that basic differences in their inherent nature and formula-
tion suggest that each should be considered separately in terms 
of the problems of undue influence. 94 Secondly, as the law is pres-
91. Tyler, The Role of Trade Unions in a Democratic Society, N.Y.U. 14TH ANN. 
CONF. ON LAB. 277, 279-80 (1961). 
92. Stein, Trade Unions in a Democracy: A Comment, N.Y.U. 14TH ANN. CoNF. ON 
LAB. 289, 293 (1961). 
93. Tyler, supra note 91, at 280. 
94. As one author noted: 
But lumping unions and corporations together ... may not result in equality 
between them because of differences in structure, wealth, membership, [etc.]. 
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ently structured, any regulation of union expenditures would 
apply equally to corporate spending.95 Finally, while labor repeat-
edly cites corporate spending as money without balance, 96 it must 
hesitantly admit that corporate expenditures have generally been 
self-balancing, being split almost equally between Democratic 
and Republican candidates.97 In contrast, labor money was spent 
almost exclusively for Democratic candidates. So secure, in fact, 
has the marriage between labor and Democrats become, that un-
ions have come to be viewed as "a dependable part of the Demo-
cratic political apparatus."98 
Certain scholars have expressed the opinion that the major 
obstacle in the way of labor's attempt to achieve its full political 
potential is the "taint of corruption" that encumbers its public 
image. 99 While stories circulate about "under-the-table deals" 
between unions and politicians, 100 labor is often hard pressed to 
satisfactorily counteract all accusations. In a partial attempt to 
justify this public image, if not completely eradicate it, a certain 
high-ranking unionist offered the following rationalization: 
This means that union political action is, in methodology, 
closely akin to practical political action. The practical politician 
... [D]istinctions should be made between corporations and unions. There 
are, for example, differences in structure, history, and legal context of the deci-
sion making process, especially concerning minority members; in the type of 
interest of union members and investors due to differences in purpose and func-
tion; in the potential size of political contributions and expenditure; and in the 
scope of federal and state regulation. These and other distinctions may warrant 
different legislative treatment of corporations and unions. They certainly sug-
gest that each organization should be considered separately in connection with 
the problems of undue influence and minority protection. 
British and American Experience, supra note 24, at 387; accord, United States v. CIO, 
335 U.S. 106, 154 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring). 
95. Regulation of union political spending, as originally enacted, was nothing more 
than a wholesale application of corporate restrictions to the labor context. This close 
joinder of corporate and union interests has continued throughout the evolution of the 
regulatory scheme and is contained in the present§ 441b provisions. The only difference 
in treatment appears in the first sentence of§ 441b, where corporations "organized by the 
authority of any law of Congress" are prevented from expending money in connection with 
any election or primary. Labor organizations and all other corporations, on the other hand, 
are restricted only with respect to federal elections and primaries. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b (a) 
(1976). 
96. Tyler, supra note 91, at 280. 
97. See British and American Experience, supra note 24, at 386 n.106. 
98. Crown, supra note 84, at 263. See id. at 261-62, 267; Masters, The Organized 
Labor Bureaucracy as a Base of Support for the Democratic Party, 27 LAw & CoNTEMP. 
PROB. 252 (1962). 
99. Crown, supra note 84, at 274-75. 
100. See id. at 267. 
120 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1977: 
must win elections . . . . The practical politician must reach for 
power, however limited, unlike the political scientist who can 
prove the inevitably corrosive influence of power in human 
hands. 
Because labor must move realistically in an immoral civili-
zation, the methodology of labor ... is necessarily molded by 
the imperatives, often distasteful, of our hypocritical culture. 101 
If for no other reason, such an approach to the political arena 
clearly requires both watchful concern and careful regulation. 
The undue influence of monied labor interests, at least in the 
public eye, is further manifested by the use of labor financial 
support in predominantly rural, agricultural, and nonindustrial 
states. The extent to which national union money has been chan-
neled into various "outside" states, particularly western, is illus-
trated by the 1956 congressional campaigns when Democratic 
candidates for both the Senate and the House received "national 
labor gifts" in almost every state in the nation. 102 The conflict of 
interest that voters justifiably fear will be created by this large-
scale political involvement outside labor's immediate areas of 
concern is demonstrated by the recent emphasis in many cam-
paigns upon the opposition's "domination by the monied inter-
ests from the East. " 103 While a Congressman favorable to labor is 
a union asset, whether elected in Idaho or Michigan, the nonin-
dustrial electorate is understandably concerned that their duly 
elected representatives will be more responsive to the hand that 
held the check than to the hand that cast the ballot. 
In light of such troublesome symptoms, 104 the Supreme 
Court's approach to the problem of undue influence in Pipefitters 
was unique. Noting Congress' dual objectives in passing the law, 
i.e., minority protection and the elimination of disproportionate 
influence, Justice Brennan explained on behalf of the Court that 
"the aggregate wealth [that Congress] plainly had in mind was 
the general union treasury-not the funds donated by union 
members of their own free and knowing choice." 105 It appears from 
this analysis that Justice Brennan confused the two separate pur-
poses, and, by compounding them into one objective, imposed the 
vehicle for minority protection as a limitation upon the process 
101. Tyler, supra note 91, at 287. 
102. Masters, supra note 98, at 257. 
103. !d. 
104. See notes 99-103 and accompanying text supra. 
105. 407 u.s. 385, 416 (1972). 
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of insuring against undue influence. In any event, as the United 
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit explained a year 
later, because of the Pipefitters decision, "unions may now con-
tribute any amount so long as it is from a proper source." 106 Dis-
senting from the majority decision in Pipefitters, Justice Powell, 
joined by Chief Justice Burger, expressed firm disagreement with 
the majority's interpretation: 
The decision of the Court today will have a profound effect 
upon the role of labor unions and corporations in the political 
life of this country. The holding, reversing a trend since 1907, 
opens the way for major participation in politics by the largest 
aggregations of economic power, the great unions and corpora-
tions.107 
From CIO to Pipefitters, the courts have continualy re-
stricted the scope of legislation regulating the use of union money 
in politics. The law, as presently construed, affords little protec-
tion against any undue influence that labor might have. If, as 
Congress originally contended, labor's influence is a legitimate 
legislative concern, the consistent failure of existing federal prohi-
bitions to remedy the situation indicates a critical need for more 
rigorous and comprehensive means of control. 
B. Minority Protection 
Most scholars agree that the strongest argument in favor of 
federal regulation of union political expenditures is that of minor-
ity protection. 108 The thrust of the minority protection argument 
was outlined in United States v. Boyle: 
[A] second purpose of [section 304 is] to assure that a dissent-
ing union member is not forced to contribute, in the form of 
mandatory dues and assessments, to support political views 
with which he disagrees. 
. . . By definition the protection of minority interests re-
quires that the majority be restrained in exercising its will over 
the minority. If a union could expend "involuntary" funds upon 
the vote of a majority of its members, minority interests would 
not be protected-they would be rendered irrelevant. 109 
106. United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755, 763 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076 
(1973). 
107. 407 U.S. at 442-43 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
108. See, e.g., Ruark, Labor's Political Spending and Free Speech, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 
61, 77 (1958). 
109. 482 F.2d 755, 763 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973). 
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In an effort to mitigate the initial appeal of this rationale, 
union supporters have fashioned a number of contrary argu-
ments. Foremost among these is the claim that since "unions are 
more homogeneous" than most organizations as well as the coun-
try as a whole, protection of dissenters' rights naturally plays a 
less significant role in the government of union affairsY0 While 
the contention is questionable even if its premise were assumed 
to be accurate, closer examination demonstrates conclusively 
that the homegeneity of union political sentiment and member-
ship is a proposition that will not stand. Union officials them-
selves have found it necessary to admit that primary among the 
factors that have presented serious obstacles in the way of 
planned political action is "lack of political solidarity among 
union members." 111 Surveys polling rank-and-file union member-
ship clearly substantiate this observation. One survey conducted 
among the unions in St. Louis, Missouri, showed that in response 
to the question "should the union advise members how to vote," 
62.2 percent of the union membership answered "no." 112 The 
same survey showed only a slight majority of the membership in 
agreement with the idea of having the union collect a dollar from 
each member in order to support friendly candidates. In a second 
survey, "over half the members (57 percent) state[d] that they 
should neither be told whom to vote for by the union nor be asked 
for voluntary donations to finance union political action." 113 
Thus, the idea that union membership is politically homogeneous 
and, therefore, less susceptible to problems concerning dissenters' 
rights is little more than a well conceived fiction. As the author 
of one survey concludes, "[t]he rank and file is split right down 
the middle about whether or not the union should be active in 
politics at all."114 
Recognizing that a substantial minority interest exists, union 
supporters have resorted to an alternative argument appealing to 
the "democratic" processes within the union and the maxim of 
majority rule. The argument claims that since the hallmark of 
democratic government is rule by the majority, and since it is the 
recognized course of all organizations that a minority of its mem-
bers must at times endure actions against its wishes and, further, 
110. See Tyler, supra note 91, at 284. 
111. Chang, supra note 6, at 554. 
112. /d. at 557 n.19. 
113. Hudson & Rosen, Union Political Actions: The Member Speaks, 7 INDUS. & LAB. 
REL. REV. 404, 410 (1954). 
114. Id. at 408. 
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since dissenters have ample opportunity before the fact to ac-
tively participate in determining organizational policies, minor-
ity union members are left without grounds for complaint when 
the majority takes action contrary to their desires. 115 As one writer 
sums up the argument, "[t]he injury to the dissenters is so 
minor, ... when compared with the benefits to the majority, 
that the promotion of a minor indignancy to a constitutional 
wrong would be injudicious. " 118 
When one looks closely at the forms of union democracy, 
however, the unionist position becomes immediately suspect. In 
the first place, labor itself admits that the unique "institutional 
qualities" peculiar to unions fashion a mode of democracy that 
is neither related nor readily comparable to the models that char-
acterize the nation as a whole. 117 Union democracy seldom if ever 
takes the form of organized elections to determine which candi-
dates or political programs union money will support. More ac-
curately, the process is one of official discretion and member 
conversion-labor hierarchy spending member contributions in 
an effort to convince union membership of the quality of chosen 
candidates. Furthermore, it seems that majority rule as an insti-
tutional philosophy is properly applied only in the context of 
organizations whose membership is voluntary.U8 The pervasive-
ness in our society of union security agreements in the form of 
union shop and agency shop contracts makes its application to 
labor organizations dubious. If majority rule has any place at all 
in the union context, it should be restricted to activities for which 
unions were organized and not allowed beyond that realm. As one 
author puts it, "[m]en join unions to increase their bargaining 
power with management, not to increase their political power 
through a pooling of money to back political candidates. " 119 
A third argument that labor expounds in refutation of the 
minority protection concern is that the actions and political ide-
115. See Woll, Unions in Politics: A Study in Law and the Workers' Needs, 34 S. 
CALIF. L. REv. 130, 141 (1961). The judiciary has occasionally shown sympathy for this 
argument. See Interntional Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 808 (1961) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 148 (1948) (Rutledge, J., 
concurring). 
116. Comment, The Compelled Contribution in the Integrated Bar and the All Union 
Shop, 1962 Wis. L. REv. 138, 149 (1962). 
117. Tyler, supra note 91, at 285. 
118. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 789 (1961) (Black, J ., 
dissenting). 
119. An Attempt to Restrict, supra note 33, at 370. See International Ass'n of Ma-
chinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 777-78 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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ologies of an organization are not necessarily meant to reflect the 
views of all of its members; thus, whatever the organization's 
position, membership is free to dissent and register its support for 
candidates and issues of its own choosing.120 Unfortunately, this 
argument ignores one basic issue. The question is not whether a 
union member will be free to support his own political ideologies, 
but whether he will be free to refrain from supporting policies and 
candidates he opposes. Moreover, the history of internal union 
discipline is not as supportive of the contention that individual 
members are at liberty to dissent as unionists might wish. A 
classic example is Mitchell & Mulgrew v. International Associa-
tion of Machinists, 121 where a California court upheld the expul-
sion by a union of three longtime members for "conduct unbe-
coming a member." The conduct so repulsive to the union was 
active campaigning for a "right to work" law which the union 
enthusiastically opposed. The impact of this kind of punitive 
action is particularly troublesome when viewed in terms of the 
general acceptance and governmental approval of agency shop 
and union shop agreements. Where union membership is made a 
condition of employment-such that, contrary to a worker's 
wishes, he must join or at least financially support a union-to 
say that the individual is free actively to support his own candi-
date may merely offer an alternative without substance. 
It is ironic that unions, which came to power by championing 
the cause of individual freedom, now provide a new arena for the 
conflict beween the interests of the individual and those of aggre-
gate power. 122 On the one hand, union interest in self-preservation 
encourages explicit political action that demands the use of union 
money. On the other hand, the individual member is often moti-
vated by more personal concerns, such as race, religion, or per-
sonal preference, which may oppose the political orientation of 
his union. When these different stances collide, labor would have 
its members believe that the union perception of the common 
good must be more correct because it is "democratic" and be-
120. Woll, Unions in Politics: A Study in Law and the Workers' Needs, 34 S. CALIF. 
L. REV. 130, 151 (1961). 
121. No. 730083 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 1960) cited in Note, Political Free Speech for 
the Union Man, 11 W. REs. L. REV. 661, 662-63 (1960). See also DeMille v. American Fed'n 
of Radio Artists, 187 P.2d 769 (1947) (Cecil B. DeMille lost union membership and a 
$98,000-a-year job because he opposed the union's one dollar per member assessment to 
prevent passage of a California "right to work" law). 
122. See Note, Political Free Speech for the Union Man, 11 W. REs. L. REv. 661 
(1960). 
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cause labor's enemy cannot be the worker's friend. The concern 
of one political scholar seems appropriate as he writes: 
Until general economic ethics change, unions could do 
nothing better than to post on every local's wall the warning of 
Oswald Spengler: 
In the beginning the leadership and the apparatus come 
into existence for the sake of the program. Then they are 
held on to defensively by the incumbents for the sake of 
power and booty . . . . Lastly the program vanishes 
from memory and the organization works for its own 
sake alone. 123 
IV. A SUGGESTED APPROACH 
A. Basic Policies and New Legislation 
Congress' struggle with the problems of union political 
spending has been frustrating and long. The result is a law the 
interpretation of which is uncertain, and the effect of which is 
questionable. Moreover, it appears that judicial interpretation 
has eliminated "undue influence" and "purity of elections" as 
workable objectives of campaign finance regulation. Whether this 
is the result of a developing attitude that unions and politics have 
moved beyond the need for such restrictions or merely the gradual 
effect of continual labor pressure and involvement is immaterial. 
It remains unlikely that more relevant objectives than those origi-
nally espoused can be invented from which to fashion meaningful 
regulation. 
Courts and congressmen alike presently admit that minority 
protection is a major justification for limiting labor spending in 
politics. Section 441b, the latest codification of the law regulating 
union political spending, attempts to deal with this problem in 
two ways: (1) by providing that all member contributions be 
made to a "separate segegated" fund, and (2) by mandating that 
all such contributions be made knowingly and voluntarily. 124 
Although the wording of the statute appears to offer an en-
couraging thrust, much of its positive power has been sapped 
through recent judicial definition. In Pipefitters, the Supreme 
Court made three crucial observations. First, it construed the 
words "separate" and "segregated" as being synonomous, hold-
ing that political funds needed to be separate from the sponsoring 
123. Crown, supra note 84, at 276. 
124. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b (b)(2)-(3)(A) (1976). 
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union only in the sense that the money had to be distinct from 
dues and assessments. 125 Second, the Court stated that while such 
a fund could not expend money from the general union treasury 
for political purposes, it could be established, administered, and 
maintained from such money. 128 Finally, concerning voluntari-
ness, the Court concluded that contributions to a segregated fund 
had to be "knowing, free-choice donations." It added, however, 
that those donations could be actively solicited by union officials, 
the determinative factor being whether the individual member 
was informed that he was free to refuse his support. 127 
The Court's rendition of the statute created significant defi-
ciencies in all three areas of its definition. First, while the statute 
by its language prohibited the threat or use of force, discrimina-
tion, or reprisals in obtaining contributions,t28 the Court's inter-
pretation prevented the statute from recognizing the more subtle 
coercion that was all too prevalent in the Pipefitters case. In spite 
of assertions on the part of the Pipefitters union officials that all 
donations were "voluntary," members' contributions were, as the 
Court itself recognized, voluntary only in the "same sense that 
[members] paid their dues or other financial obligations."129 
Quoting with approval from the lower court, Justice Brennan 
conceded that "[i]t would appear to be unrealistic to believe 
that such a large number of workmen would make such substan-
tial voluntary contributions to be used for political purposes un-
less they felt that their job security required them to do so."130 
The_ fact that such circumstances would satisfy the letter of the 
law offers perhaps the most conclusive evidence of its weakness. 
Thus, from the standpoint of minority protection, and in 
order to insure that political donations are not only knowingly 
made, but are voluntaey in a sense broader than the fact that an 
authorization card defines them to be so, the law regulating polit-
ical spending demands revision. It appears that the only certain 
way to guarantee protection to dissenting union members is to 
remove the crucial factor of identity from the donation process by 
making member contributions anonymous. Anonymity might be 
accomplished in a number of ways. One possible means would be 
125. 407 u.s. 385, 414, 421-22 (1972). 
126. ld. at 429-30. 
127. I d. at 414, 415. 
128. Federal Election Campaign Act§ 205, 86 Stat. 10 (1972). 
129. 407 U.S. at 393. 
130. 407 U.S. at 393 n.4. For a discussion of the British experience with similar 
problems, see British and American Experience, supra note 24, at 383. 
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through the use of prepared donation envelopes and designated 
collection boxes. This would permit vigorous solicitation, even by 
union officials, while maintaining personal security for union 
membership. Undoubtedly, union supporters will complain that 
such a procedure would severely limit available funds. This la-
ment, however, argues more for the claim that the present system 
produces coerced donations than it does for the preservation of 
that system. 
The second weakness created by the Court's reading in 
Pipefitters of the statutory prohibitions on union spending is that 
while general union dues money cannot itself be expended for 
political purposes (thus, protecting minority members who op-
posed ideologies which those funds would support), it can be 
utilized to establish and administer the fund that finances politi-
cal activity. In light of the policy against mandatory political 
support, it is a distinction without a difference to protect a union 
member against forced financial backing of a political candidate 
and at the same time require him to maintain the organization 
that will finance that candidate. The most plausible alternative 
would be to require a political fund to originate and maintain 
itself from the source of its money, namely, "voluntary" contribu-
tions. 
The third weakness infused into the statute by Pipefitters 
resulted from the Court's narrow reading of the phrase "separate 
segregated fund." Justice Brennan, without justifying his prefer-
ence for a more restrictive reading, was generous enough to con-
cede that the words "separate" and "segregated," as used by the 
legislature in defining the restrictions on union spending, 
normally would not be read as synonomous, and that their com-
bined use normally would mean "an apartness beyond segre-
gated. " 131 Since Congress admittedly was seeking to further the 
objective of minority protection, the normal reading appears to 
offer the better alternative. Not only would the danger of com-
mingling and misuse of funds, inadvertent as well as willful, be 
less likely under the application of a broader definition, ·but the 
unhealthy domination and control by interested union officials of 
this kind of "segregated" fund could be avoided with more cer-
tainty. By requiring the fund to be separated from the union, both 
as to money and personnel, and by forbidding salaries and ex pen-
ses to be drawn from union treasuries, the ideal of minority pro-
tection could be more realistically served. 
131. 407 U.S. at 421-22. 
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Although undue influence and purity of elections have argua-
bly been eliminated as viable objectives of existing regulation of 
labor political expenditures, it would be naive, particularly in 
view of present legislative efforts to police campaign financing, to 
assume that lawmakers have forgotten the significance of such 
concerns. Numerous suggestions have been made by scholars as 
to the best way to incorporate these objectives into new legisla-
tion regulating union spending. 132 Of these suggestions, a dollar 
limitation on allowable labor spending appears to be the most 
. direct and effective means to achieve the desired purpose. Earlier 
attempts in this vein have been unsuccessful, but their failure 
derived more from flabby draftsmanship than inherent weakness. 
To insure that prior failures are not repeated, two supplementary 
points of focus might be useful. First, Congress should establish 
a dollar limitation on the amount of "segregated" union money 
that politicians and party campaign committees may accept. 133 
Second, Congress should restrict the dollar amount of 
"expenditures" that segregated union campaign funds would be 
allowed to make. 134 
132. E.g., Chang, supra note 6, at 572; Ruark, Labor's Political Spending and Free 
Speech, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 61, 76-77 (1958); Comment, Restraints on Labor and Corporate 
Expenditures in Federal Elections, 24 Mo. L. REv. 528, 537 (1959); Comment, Unions in 
the Political Arena: Legislative Attempts to Control Union Participation in Politics, 23 
Sw. L.J. 713, 723-25, 726-27 (1969); Political Contributions by Labor Unions, supra note 
15, at 673. 
133. Such a restriction was explicitly declared constitutional in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
u.s. 1, 25 (1976). 
134. The suggestion that a ceiling be placed upon dollar "expenditures" as well as 
"contributions" immediately faces two significant obstacles. First, the legislature must 
carefully draft any such limitation to avoid a loophole similar to that which unions ex-
ploited in the early 1940's in order to escape the $5000 Hatch Act restrictions. See notes 
18-19 and accompanying text su~ra. In this regard, Congress must take care to insure that 
expenditure limitations are not nullified through fractionalization of segregated union 
political funds into numerous organizations, each expending the allotted amount. Like-
wise, Congress must avoid the use of local labor organizations which might circumvent 
the effect of expenditure limitations that would otherwise apply if fewer national or re-
gional organizations controlled the distribution of money. 
A second, and certainly more substantial, obstacle to expenditure limitations is posed 
by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In 
that case, the Court upheld contribution restrictions imposed by the 1974 amendments 
to the Federal Election Campaign Act, but declared that limitations on political expendi-
tures amounted to an unconstitutional burden upon free speech. The Court's distinction 
between contributions and expenditures was questioned by Justice White in a separate 
opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, as he urged that the expenditure 
limitation be upheld: 
In sustaining the contribution limits, the Court recognizes the importance 
of avoiding public misapprehension about a candidate's reliance on large contri-
butions. It ignores that consideration in invalidating [the expenditure limita-
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B. Constitutionality 
Since the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, constitution-
ality has been a nagging sore for advocates of restrictive legisla-
tions]. In like fashion, it says that Congress was entitled to determine that the 
criminal provisions against bribery and corruption, together with the disclosure 
provisions, would not in themselves be adequate to combat the evil and that 
limits on contributions should be provided. Here, the Court rejects the identical 
kind of judgment made by Congress as to the need for and utility of expenditure 
limits. 
424 U.S. at 262. Justice White's hypothetical concerning two brothers, each with a million 
dollars to spend, one of whom contributes money, while the other expends it, clearly 
illustrates the basic concern. Scholars, likewise, have been ill at ease with the Court's 
decision. This disapproval was appropriately articulated by one writer in the following 
words: 
White felt the expenditure limits should be upheld because the purposes served 
were legitimate and substantial. First, the expenditure ceilings reinforce the 
contribution limits. With the rising costs of campaigns, the pressure to raise 
funds will constantly build. This tempts the candidate to resort to those 
individuals having large sums of money who are sufficiently confident of not 
being caught to risk flouting the contribution limits. The regulations saved the 
candidate from this dilemma by imposing a reasonable ceiling on all candidates. 
Second, the expenditure limits have their own potential for preventing the cor-
ruption of federal elections: 'There are many illegal ways of spending money to 
influence elections. One would be blind to history to deny that unlimited money 
tempts people to spend it on whatever money can buy to influence an election 
.... [T]he expenditure limits could play a substantial role in preventing 
unethical practices. There just wouldn't be enough of "that kind of money" to 
go around.' Third, the expenditure limits would ease the candidates' obsession 
with fund-raising, thereby freeing them and their staffs to communicate in more 
places and ways unconnected with the fund-raising function. Fourth, the ceil-
ings would help restore and maintain public confidence in federal elections; it 
is critical to dispel the impression that federal elections are purely and simply 
a function of money. Justice Whie concluded by saying that because the ceilings 
were not too low, the limitations would ensure that the election could not tum 
on the difference in the amounts of money candidates have to spend. He ex-
pressed his alarm that '[t]he [Court's] holding perhaps is not that federal 
candidates have the constitutional right to purchase their election, but many 
will so interpret the Court's conclusion in this case.' . . . Justice White's argu-
ments are persuasive. As the cases concerning corporations, unions ... demon-
strate, the Court has historically been concerned with the corrosive effect which 
unregulated spending has on the integrity of the electoral process and the pub-
lic's faith in it. 
Comment, The Constitutionality of Limitations on Individual Political Campaign Contri-
butions and Expenditures: The Supreme Court's Decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 25 EMORY 
L.J. 400, 439-40 (1976) (footnotes omitted). 
It is possible, although uncertain, that the Buckley decision comprises a less impres-
sive obstacle to expenditure limitations than one would at first suppose. In upholding the 
contribution restrictions in that case, the Court declared that such a limitation "entails 
only a marginal restriction on the contributor's ability to engage in free communication." 
424 U.S. at 20. In light of this language, a somewhat less severe restriction on expenditures 
than the $1000 limitation might pass as a "marginal restriction on the contributor's 
ability." 
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tive governing the political use of labor money. For nearly thirty 
years, the Supreme Court has deftly avoided speaking directly to 
this issue. Instead, it has teased and intimidated Congress and 
the Justice Department with "grave doubts" and stirring dissents 
denouncing regulation to the point that no one is certain what the 
status of the law actually is. Thus, although regulation of union 
political involvement has never authoritatively been declared 
unconstitutional, it is clear that any new legislatio'n must neces-
sarily contend with the specter of that possibility. 
The constitutionality of Congress' power to regulate the use 
of money in the political arena was established as early as 1916 
in the case of United States v. United States Brewers' Ass'n. 135 
The constitutional basis justifying such regulation was two-
pronged: (1) the clause in article I, section 4 that permits Con-
gress to control "the Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elec-
tions," and (2) the "necessary and proper" clause of article I, 
section 8, which allows the legislature broad power in preserving 
the purity of the political process. The Supreme Court sanctioned 
the application of this power to labor political spending in the 
CIO case: 
There can be little doubt of Congress' power to regulate the 
making of political contributions and expenditures by labor un-
ions, as well as by other organizations and individuals, in the 
interest of free and pure elections and the prevention of official 
corruption . . . .138 
Congressional power in this regard, as in every other, however, is 
not absolute. As political theorists have been quick to point out, 
any federal regulation that invades the realm of political expres-
sion necessarily must be weighed against the importance of first 
amendment rights. 137 • 
Just as congressional power is not absolute, neither are the 
constitutional freedoms against which legislative action is mea-
sured. Political theorists likewise have consistently expressed the 
opinion that 
"freedom [of speech and press] does not deprive a state of the 
primary and essential right of self-preservation, which, so long 
135. 239 F. 163 (W.D. Pa. 1916). 
136. 335 U.S. 106, 139 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring). 
137. E.g., Goodman & Thomason, Prohibition of Expenditures by Labor Unions in 
Connection with Federal Elections, 21 GA. B.J. 575, 579-80 (1959); Comment, Restraints 
on Labor and Corporate Expenditures in Federal Elections, 24 Mo. L. REV. 528,533 (1959). 
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as human governments endure, they cannot be denied." Preser-
vation of the electoral process would . . . appear essential to the 
preservation of our form of government. 138 
131 
The issue, therefore, is not so much whether a particular enact-
ment of campaign finance regulation affects the enjoyment of 
first amendment rights, but whether it constitutes an infringe-
ment severe enough to warrant a remedy. The courts have devel-
oped two closely related standards in order to define the permissi-
ble limits beyond which invasion by Congress of first amendment 
guarantees cannot go. The first requires that before first amend-
ment freedoms may be infringed, a "clear and present danger" 
must exist, threatening substantive evils that the government is 
empowered to prevent.t39 The second similarly demands a 
"compelling state interest" that necessitates the abridging legis-
lation.140 In terms of undue influence, the judiciary and the legis-
lature have long recognized the inherent threat to the integrity of 
democratic government associated with accumulated wealth. 
The fears expressed have not been disproven in practice. Labor 
unions as well as other powerful interest groups have produced 
such a disproportionate effect upon the political arena and so 
jeopardized the integrity of the system that extensive energy has 
been expended in the lawmaking bodies to develop workable laws 
restricting their activity. As Justice Powell so aptly noted in his 
Pipefitters dissent, unnecessary restrictions upon congressional 
efforts to prevent undue influence and preserve the purity of elec-
tions are occurring "at a time paradoxically when public and 
legisltive interest has focused on limiting-rather than enlarg-
ing-the influence upon the elective process of concentrations of 
wealth and power ._" 141 
The need for minority protection offers perhaps the most 
compelling reason for federal regulation of organized labor politi-
cal spending. Undoubtedly, this derives partially from the nature 
of the interest involved. That is, the conflict concerns the balanc-
ing not of a public interest against a constitutional right but of 
the first amendment rights of an individual against those of an 
institution. Although the question of whether or not first amend-
ment rights apply to institutions, and if so to what extent, has 
138. Goodman & Thomason, Prohibition of Expenditures by Labor Unions in 
Connection with Federal Elections, 21 GA. B.J. 575, 580 (1959). 
139. Originally stated in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
140. United States v. Pipefitters Local562, 434 F.2d 1116, 1123 (8th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 
407 u.s. 385 (1972). 
141. 407 U.S. 385, 443 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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never been conclusively answered, 142 there can be little argument 
that, as between institutions and individuals, the lat,ter enjoy a 
preferred status. Moreover, in the realm of labor political involve-
ment, it appears that the conflict is not between the organiza-
tion's right of free speech and the individual's same right as much 
as it is between convenience to the union in communicating polit-
ical preferences and the right of the member to refrain from sup-
porting repugnant ideologies. After all, the union can still voice 
its opinion loudly. It must do so, however, without the money of 
dissenting members. In any event, the courts have registered an 
influential vote confirming the compelling interests that underlie 
the regulation of spending to insure minority protection. In its 
consideration of the Pipefitters case, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit articulated its vote as follows: 
Congress in passing [Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act] was 
attempting to protect the individual union member's right to his 
own political views and the right to support or not to support 
them through money contributions. In light of the substantial 
interest each individual has in his own political activities, it 
follows that Congress in passing the legislation was responding 
to a compelling interest.143 
V. CONCLUSION 
Existing legislative restrictions upon the financial involve-
ment of labor organizations in the political arena have suffered 
extensively from the eroding elements of judicial interpretation, 
union exploitation, and legislative repair. As presently consti-
tuted, the law offers an explicit example of the consequences that 
follow from placing "new wine into old bottles" -neither is the 
wine enhanced nor are the bottles preserved. If the problems of 
union political involvement are to be resolved in understandable 
and effective terms, lawmakers need to clear the table and begin 
a fresh legislative structure upon the foundational objectives of 
preventing undue influence, preserving the purity of elections, 
and protecting the interests of the political minority. 
142. See, e.g., Goodman & Thomason, Prohibition of Expenditures by Labor Unions 
in Connection with Federal Elections, 21 GA. B.J. 575, 577-78 (1959); Kovarsky, Unions 
and Federal Elections-A Social and Legal Analysis, 12 ST. LoUis U.L.J. 358, 374 (1968); 
Ruark, Labor's Political Spending and Free Speech, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 61, 73-74 (1958); 
Comment, Section 304, Taft-Hartley Act: Validity of Restrictions on Union Political 
Activity, 57 YALE L.J. 806, 816 (1948). 
143. 434 F.2d 1116, 1123 (8th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 407 U.S. 385 (1972). See International 
Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 777-78 (Douglas, J., concurring), 783-
84 (Black, J., dissenting), 788-89 (Black, J., dissenting) (1961). 
